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jueves, 3 de octubre de 2024
lunes, 1 de julio de 2019
Your Professional Decline Is Coming (Much) Sooner Than You Think
Here’s how to make the most of it.
At the end of the flight, as the lights switched on, I finally got a look at the desolate man. I was shocked. I recognized him—he was, and still is, world-famous. Then in his mid‑80s, he was beloved as a hero for his courage, patriotism, and accomplishments many decades ago.
For selfish reasons, I couldn’t get the cognitive dissonance of that scene out of my mind. It was the summer of 2015, shortly after my 51st birthday. I was not world-famous like the man on the plane, but my professional life was going very well. I was the president of a flourishing Washington think tank, the American Enterprise Institute. I had written some best-selling books. People came to my speeches. My columns were published in The New York Times.
But I had started to wonder: Can I really keep this going? I work like a maniac. But even if I stayed at it 12 hours a day, seven days a week, at some point my career would slow and stop. And when it did, what then? Would I one day be looking back wistfully and wishing I were dead? Was there anything I could do, starting now, to give myself a shot at avoiding misery—and maybe even achieve happiness—when the music inevitably stops?
Though these questions were personal, I decided to approach them as the social scientist I am, treating them as a research project. It felt unnatural—like a surgeon taking out his own appendix. But I plunged ahead, and for the past four years, I have been on a quest to figure out how to turn my eventual professional decline from a matter of dread into an opportunity for progress.
The field of “happiness studies” has boomed over the past two decades, and a consensus has developed about well-being as we advance through life. In The Happiness Curve: Why Life Gets Better After 50, Jonathan Rauch, a Brookings Institution scholar and an Atlantic contributing editor, reviews the strong evidence suggesting that the happiness of most adults declines through their 30s and 40s, then bottoms out in their early 50s. Nothing about this pattern is set in stone, of course. But the data seem eerily consistent with my experience: My 40s and early 50s were not an especially happy period of my life, notwithstanding my professional fortunes.
So what can people expect after that, based on the data? The news is mixed. Almost all studies of happiness over the life span show that, in wealthier countries, most people’s contentment starts to increase again in their 50s, until age 70 or so. That is where things get less predictable, however. After 70, some people stay steady in happiness; others get happier until death. Others—men in particular—see their happiness plummet. Indeed, depression and suicide rates for men increase after age 75.
Maybe not. Though the literature on this question is sparse, giftedness and achievements early in life do not appear to provide an insurance policy against suffering later on. In 1999, Carole Holahan and Charles Holahan, psychologists at the University of Texas, published an influential paper in The International Journal of Aging and Human Development that looked at hundreds of older adults who early in life had been identified as highly gifted. The Holahans’ conclusion: “Learning at a younger age of membership in a study of intellectual giftedness was related to … less favorable psychological well-being at age eighty.”
This study may simply be showing that it’s hard to live up to high expectations, and that telling your kid she is a genius is not necessarily good parenting. (The Holahans surmise that the children identified as gifted might have made intellectual ability more central to their self-appraisal, creating “unrealistic expectations for success” and causing them to fail to “take into account the many other life influences on success and recognition.”) However, abundant evidence suggests that the waning of ability in people of high accomplishment is especially brutal psychologically. Consider professional athletes, many of whom struggle profoundly after their sports career ends. Tragic examples abound, involving depression, addiction, or suicide; unhappiness in retired athletes may even be the norm, at least temporarily. A study published in the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology in 2003, which charted the life satisfaction of former Olympic athletes, found that they generally struggled with a low sense of personal control when they first stopped competing.
Why might former elite performers have such a hard time? No academic research has yet proved this, but I strongly suspect that the memory of remarkable ability, if that is the source of one’s self-worth, might, for some, provide an invidious contrast to a later, less remarkable life. “Unhappy is he who depends on success to be happy,” Alex Dias Ribeiro, a former Formula 1 race-car driver, once wrote. “For such a person, the end of a successful career is the end of the line. His destiny is to die of bitterness or to search for more success in other careers and to go on living from success to success until he falls dead. In this case, there will not be life after success.”
Call it the Principle of Psychoprofessional Gravitation: the idea that the agony of professional oblivion is directly related to the height of professional prestige previously achieved, and to one’s emotional attachment to that prestige. Problems related to achieving professional success might appear to be a pretty good species of problem to have; even raising this issue risks seeming precious. But if you reach professional heights and are deeply invested in being high up, you can suffer mightily when you inevitably fall. That’s the man on the plane. Maybe that will be you, too. And, without significant intervention, I suspect it will be me.
But as Darwin progressed into his 50s, he stagnated; he hit a wall in his research. At the same time an Austrian monk by the name of Gregor Mendel discovered what Darwin needed to continue his work: the theory of genetic inheritance. Unfortunately, Mendel’s work was published in an obscure academic journal and Darwin never saw it—and in any case, Darwin did not have the mathematical ability to understand it. From then on he made little progress. Depressed in his later years, he wrote to a close friend, “I have not the heart or strength at my age to begin any investigation lasting years, which is the only thing which I enjoy.”
Presumably, Darwin would be pleasantly surprised to learn how his fame grew after his death, in 1882. From what he could see when he was old, however, the world had passed him by, and he had become irrelevant. That could have been Darwin on the plane behind me that night.
It also could have been a younger version of me, because I have had precocious experience with professional decline.
As a child, I had just one goal: to be the world’s greatest French-horn player. I worked at it slavishly, practicing hours a day, seeking out the best teachers, and playing in any ensemble I could find. I had pictures of famous horn players on my bedroom wall for inspiration. And for a while, I thought my dream might come true. At 19, I left college to take a job playing professionally in a touring chamber-music ensemble. My plan was to keep rising through the classical-music ranks, joining a top symphony orchestra in a few years or maybe even becoming a soloist—the most exalted job a classical musician can hold.But then, in my early 20s, a strange thing happened: I started getting worse. To this day, I have no idea why. My technique began to suffer, and I had no explanation for it. Nothing helped. I visited great teachers and practiced more, but I couldn’t get back to where I had been. Pieces that had been easy to play became hard; pieces that had been hard became impossible.
Perhaps the worst moment in my young but flailing career came at age 22, when I was performing at Carnegie Hall. While delivering a short speech about the music I was about to play, I stepped forward, lost my footing, and fell off the stage into the audience. On the way home from the concert, I mused darkly that the experience was surely a message from God.
Life goes on, right? Sort of. After finishing my studies, I became a university professor, a job I enjoyed. But I still thought every day about my beloved first vocation. Even now, I regularly dream that I am onstage, and wake to remember that my childhood aspirations are now only phantasms.
I am lucky to have accepted my decline at a young enough age that I could redirect my life into a new line of work. Still, to this day, the sting of that early decline makes these words difficult to write. I vowed to myself that it wouldn’t ever happen again.
Will it happen again? In some professions, early decline is inescapable. No one expects an Olympic athlete to remain competitive until age 60. But in many physically nondemanding occupations, we implicitly reject the inevitability of decline before very old age. Sure, our quads and hamstrings may weaken a little as we age. But as long as we retain our marbles, our quality of work as a writer, lawyer, executive, or entrepreneur should remain high up to the very end, right? Many people think so. I recently met a man a bit older than I am who told me he planned to “push it until the wheels came off.” In effect, he planned to stay at the very top of his game by any means necessary, and then keel over.

The specific timing of peak and decline vary somewhat depending on the field. Benjamin Jones, a professor of strategy and entrepreneurship at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management, has spent years studying when people are most likely to make prizewinning scientific discoveries and develop key inventions. His findings can be summarized by this little ditty:
Age is, of course, a fever chillThe author of those gloomy lines? Paul Dirac, a winner of the 1933 Nobel Prize in Physics.
that every physicist must fear.
He’s better dead than living still
when once he’s past his thirtieth year.
Dirac overstates the point, but only a little. Looking at major inventors and Nobel winners going back more than a century, Jones has found that the most common age for producing a magnum opus is the late 30s. He has shown that the likelihood of a major discovery increases steadily through one’s 20s and 30s and then declines through one’s 40s, 50s, and 60s. Are there outliers? Of course. But the likelihood of producing a major innovation at age 70 is approximately what it was at age 20—almost nonexistent.
Entrepreneurs peak and decline earlier, on average. After earning fame and fortune in their 20s, many tech entrepreneurs are in creative decline by age 30. In 2014, the Harvard Business Review reported that founders of enterprises valued at $1 billion or more by venture capitalists tend to cluster in the 20-to-34 age range. Subsequent research has found that the clustering might be slightly later, but all studies in this area have found that the majority of successful start-ups have founders under age 50.
This research concerns people at the very top of professions that are atypical. But the basic finding appears to apply more broadly. Scholars at Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research studied a wide variety of jobs and found considerable susceptibility to age-related decline in fields ranging from policing to nursing. Other research has found that the best-performing home-plate umpires in Major League Baseball have 18 years less experience and are 23 years younger than the worst-performing umpires (who are 56.1 years old, on average). Among air traffic controllers, the age-related decline is so sharp—and the potential consequences of decline-related errors so dire—that the mandatory retirement age is 56.
Sorry.
If decline not only is inevitable but also happens earlier than most of us expect, what should we do when it comes for us?
Whole sections of bookstores are dedicated to becoming successful. The shelves are packed with titles like The Science of Getting Rich and The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. There is no section marked “Managing Your Professional Decline.”But some people have managed their declines well. Consider the case of Johann Sebastian Bach. Born in 1685 to a long line of prominent musicians in central Germany, Bach quickly distinguished himself as a musical genius. In his 65 years, he published more than 1,000 compositions for all the available instrumentations of his day.
Early in his career, Bach was considered an astoundingly gifted organist and improviser. Commissions rolled in; royalty sought him out; young composers emulated his style. He enjoyed real prestige.
But it didn’t last—in no small part because his career was overtaken by musical trends ushered in by, among others, his own son, Carl Philipp Emanuel, known as C.P.E. to the generations that followed. The fifth of Bach’s 20 children, C.P.E. exhibited the musical gifts his father had. He mastered the baroque idiom, but he was more fascinated with a new “classical” style of music, which was taking Europe by storm. As classical music displaced baroque, C.P.E.’s prestige boomed while his father’s music became passé.

The lesson for you and me, especially after 50: Be Johann Sebastian Bach, not Charles Darwin.
How does one do that?
A potential answer lies in the work of the British psychologist Raymond Cattell, who in the early 1940s introduced the concepts of fluid and crystallized intelligence. Cattell defined fluid intelligence as the ability to reason, analyze, and solve novel problems—what we commonly think of as raw intellectual horsepower. Innovators typically have an abundance of fluid intelligence. It is highest relatively early in adulthood and diminishes starting in one’s 30s and 40s. This is why tech entrepreneurs, for instance, do so well so early, and why older people have a much harder time innovating.Crystallized intelligence, in contrast, is the ability to use knowledge gained in the past. Think of it as possessing a vast library and understanding how to use it. It is the essence of wisdom. Because crystallized intelligence relies on an accumulating stock of knowledge, it tends to increase through one’s 40s, and does not diminish until very late in life.
Here’s a practical lesson we can extract from all this: No matter what mix of intelligence your field requires, you can always endeavor to weight your career away from innovation and toward the strengths that persist, or even increase, later in life.
Like what? As Bach demonstrated, teaching is an ability that decays very late in life, a principal exception to the general pattern of professional decline over time. A study in The Journal of Higher Education showed that the oldest college professors in disciplines requiring a large store of fixed knowledge, specifically the humanities, tended to get evaluated most positively by students. This probably explains the professional longevity of college professors, three-quarters of whom plan to retire after age 65—more than half of them after 70, and some 15 percent of them after 80. (The average American retires at 61.) One day, during my first year as a professor, I asked a colleague in his late 60s whether he’d ever considered retiring. He laughed, and told me he was more likely to leave his office horizontally than vertically.
Our dean might have chuckled ruefully at this—college administrators complain that research productivity among tenured faculty drops off significantly in the last decades of their career. Older professors take up budget slots that could otherwise be used to hire young scholars hungry to do cutting-edge research. But perhaps therein lies an opportunity: If older faculty members can shift the balance of their work from research to teaching without loss of professional prestige, younger faculty members can take on more research.
That older people, with their stores of wisdom, should be the most successful teachers seems almost cosmically right. No matter what our profession, as we age we can dedicate ourselves to sharing knowledge in some meaningful way.
A few years ago, I saw a cartoon of a man on his deathbed saying, “I wish I’d bought more crap.” It has always amazed me that many wealthy people keep working to increase their wealth, amassing far more money than they could possibly spend or even usefully bequeath. One day I asked a wealthy friend why this is so. Many people who have gotten rich know how to measure their self-worth only in pecuniary terms, he explained, so they stay on the hamster wheel, year after year. They believe that at some point, they will finally accumulate enough to feel truly successful, happy, and therefore ready to die.
This is a mistake, and not a benign one. Most Eastern philosophy warns that focusing on acquisition leads to attachment and vanity, which derail the search for happiness by obscuring one’s essential nature. As we grow older, we shouldn’t acquire more, but rather strip things away to find our true selves—and thus, peace.What I need to do, in effect, is stop seeing my life as a canvas to fill, and start seeing it more as a block of marble to chip away at and shape something out of. I need a reverse bucket list. My goal for each year of the rest of my life should be to throw out things, obligations, and relationships until I can clearly see my refined self in its best form.
And that self is … who, exactly?

Acharya answered elliptically, explaining an ancient Hindu teaching about the stages of life, or ashramas. The first is Brahmacharya, the period of youth and young adulthood dedicated to learning. The second is Grihastha, when a person builds a career, accumulates wealth, and creates a family. In this second stage, the philosophers find one of life’s most common traps: People become attached to earthly rewards—money, power, sex, prestige—and thus try to make this stage last a lifetime.
The antidote to these worldly temptations is Vanaprastha, the third ashrama, whose name comes from two Sanskrit words meaning “retiring” and “into the forest.” This is the stage, usually starting around age 50, in which we purposefully focus less on professional ambition, and become more and more devoted to spirituality, service, and wisdom. This doesn’t mean that you need to stop working when you turn 50—something few people can afford to do—only that your life goals should adjust.
Vanaprastha is a time for study and training for the last stage of life, Sannyasa, which should be totally dedicated to the fruits of enlightenment. In times past, some Hindu men would leave their family in old age, take holy vows, and spend the rest of their life at the feet of masters, praying and studying. Even if sitting in a cave at age 75 isn’t your ambition, the point should still be clear: As we age, we should resist the conventional lures of success in order to focus on more transcendentally important things.
There is a message in this for those of us suffering from the Principle of Psychoprofessional Gravitation. Say you are a hard-charging, type-A lawyer, executive, entrepreneur, or—hypothetically, of course—president of a think tank. From early adulthood to middle age, your foot is on the gas, professionally. Living by your wits—by your fluid intelligence—you seek the material rewards of success, you attain a lot of them, and you are deeply attached to them. But the wisdom of Hindu philosophy—and indeed the wisdom of many philosophical traditions—suggests that you should be prepared to walk away from these rewards before you feel ready. Even if you’re at the height of your professional prestige, you probably need to scale back your career ambitions in order to scale up your metaphysical ones.
When the new york times columnist David Brooks talks about the difference between “résumé virtues” and “eulogy virtues,” he’s effectively putting the ashramas in a practical context. Résumé virtues are professional and oriented toward earthly success. They require comparison with others. Eulogy virtues are ethical and spiritual, and require no comparison. Your eulogy virtues are what you would want people to talk about at your funeral. As in He was kind and deeply spiritual, not He made senior vice president at an astonishingly young age and had a lot of frequent-flier miles.
I suspect that my own terror of professional decline is rooted in a fear of death—a fear that, even if it is not conscious, motivates me to act as if death will never come by denying any degradation in my résumé virtues. This denial is destructive, because it leads me to ignore the eulogy virtues that bring me the greatest joy.
How can I overcome this tendency? The Buddha recommends, of all things, corpse meditation: Many Theravada Buddhist monasteries in Thailand and Sri Lanka display photos of corpses in various states of decomposition for the monks to contemplate. “This body, too,” students are taught to say about their own body, “such is its nature, such is its future, such is its unavoidable fate.” At first this seems morbid. But its logic is grounded in psychological principles—and it’s not an exclusively Eastern idea. “To begin depriving death of its greatest advantage over us,” Michel de Montaigne wrote in the 16th century, “let us deprive death of its strangeness, let us frequent it, let us get used to it; let us have nothing more often in mind than death.”
Psychologists call this desensitization, in which repeated exposure to something repellent or frightening makes it seem ordinary, prosaic, not scary. And for death, it works. In 2017, a team of researchers at several American universities recruited volunteers to imagine they were terminally ill or on death row, and then to write blog posts about either their imagined feelings or their would-be final words. The researchers then compared these expressions with the writings and last words of people who were actually dying or facing capital punishment. The results, published in Psychological Science, were stark: The words of the people merely imagining their imminent death were three times as negative as those of the people actually facing death—suggesting that, counterintuitively, death is scarier when it is theoretical and remote than when it is a concrete reality closing in.
Decline is inevitable, and it occurs earlier than almost any of us wants to believe. But misery is not inevitable. Accepting the natural cadence of our abilities sets up the possibility of transcendence, because it allows the shifting of attention to higher spiritual and life priorities.
But such a shift demands more than mere platitudes. I embarked on my research with the goal of producing a tangible road map to guide me during the remaining years of my life. This has yielded four specific commitments.
JUMP
The biggest mistake professionally successful people make is attempting to sustain peak accomplishment indefinitely, trying to make use of the kind of fluid intelligence that begins fading relatively early in life. This is impossible. The key is to enjoy accomplishments for what they are in the moment, and to walk away perhaps before I am completely ready—but on my own terms.So: I’ve resigned my job as president of the American Enterprise Institute, effective right about the time this essay is published. While I have not detected deterioration in my performance, it was only a matter of time. Like many executive positions, the job is heavily reliant on fluid intelligence. Also, I wanted freedom from the consuming responsibilities of that job, to have time for more spiritual pursuits. In truth, this decision wasn’t entirely about me. I love my institution and have seen many others like it suffer when a chief executive lingered too long.

SERVE
Time is limited, and professional ambition crowds out things that ultimately matter more. To move from résumé virtues to eulogy virtues is to move from activities focused on the self to activities focused on others. This is not easy for me; I am a naturally egotistical person. But I have to face the fact that the costs of catering to selfishness are ruinous—and I now work every day to fight this tendency.Fortunately, an effort to serve others can play to our strengths as we age. Remember, people whose work focuses on teaching or mentorship, broadly defined, peak later in life. I am thus moving to a phase in my career in which I can dedicate myself fully to sharing ideas in service of others, primarily by teaching at a university. My hope is that my most fruitful years lie ahead.
WORSHIP
Because I’ve talked a lot about various religious and spiritual traditions—and emphasized the pitfalls of overinvestment in career success—readers might naturally conclude that I am making a Manichaean separation between the worlds of worship and work, and suggesting that the emphasis be on worship. That is not my intention. I do strongly recommend that each person explore his or her spiritual self—I plan to dedicate a good part of the rest of my life to the practice of my own faith, Roman Catholicism. But this is not incompatible with work; on the contrary, if we can detach ourselves from worldly attachments and redirect our efforts toward the enrichment and teaching of others, work itself can become a transcendental pursuit.Bach finished each of his manuscripts with the words Soli Deo gloria—“Glory to God alone.” He failed, however, to write these words on his last manuscript, “Contrapunctus 14,” from The Art of Fugue, which abruptly stops mid-measure. His son C.P.E. added these words to the score: “Über dieser Fuge … ist der Verfasser gestorben” (“At this point in the fugue … the composer died”). Bach’s life and work merged with his prayers as he breathed his last breath. This is my aspiration.
CONNECT
Throughout this essay, I have focused on the effect that the waning of my work prowess will have on my happiness. But an abundance of research strongly suggests that happiness—not just in later years but across the life span—is tied directly to the health and plentifulness of one’s relationships. Pushing work out of its position of preeminence—sooner rather than later—to make space for deeper relationships can provide a bulwark against the angst of professional decline.Dedicating more time to relationships, and less to work, is not inconsistent with continued achievement. “He is like a tree planted by streams of water,” the Book of Psalms says of the righteous person, “yielding its fruit in season, whose leaf does not wither, and who prospers in all he does.” Think of an aspen tree. To live a life of extraordinary accomplishment is—like the tree—to grow alone, reach majestic heights alone, and die alone. Right?
Wrong. The aspen tree is an excellent metaphor for a successful person—but not, it turns out, for its solitary majesty. Above the ground, it may appear solitary. Yet each individual tree is part of an enormous root system, which is together one plant. In fact, an aspen is one of the largest living organisms in the world; a single grove in Utah, called Pando, spans 106 acres and weighs an estimated 13 million pounds.
The secret to bearing my decline—to enjoying it—is to become more conscious of the roots linking me to others. If I have properly developed the bonds of love among my family and friends, my own withering will be more than offset by blooming in others.
When i talk about this personal research project I’ve been pursuing, people usually ask: Whatever happened to the hero on the plane?
I think about him a lot. He’s still famous, popping up in the news from time to time. Early on, when I saw a story about him, I would feel a flash of something like pity—which I now realize was really only a refracted sense of terror about my own future. Poor guy really meant I’m screwed.But as my grasp of the principles laid out in this essay has deepened, my fear has declined proportionately. My feeling toward the man on the plane is now one of gratitude for what he taught me. I hope that he can find the peace and joy he is inadvertently helping me attain.
miércoles, 27 de febrero de 2019
lunes, 25 de febrero de 2019
jueves, 15 de noviembre de 2018
Franco Berardi: No hay salida del nazismo global
“No hay salida del nazismo global”
Entrevista al filósofo italiano Franco Berardi
Para Berardi, las personas resignaron su capacidad para pensar y sentir y, mientras la falta de diálogo impide la organización, nuevos gobiernos represivos controlan todo sin necesidad de recurrir a ejércitos. “Hoy no nos relacionamos”, asegura.
Por Pablo Esteban
El filósofo Franco “Bifo” Berardi tiene la sonrisa fácil. Es profesor de la Universidad de Bologna desde hace mucho tiempo pero antes, cuando solo tenía 18 años, participó de las revueltas juveniles del 68’, se hizo amigo de Félix Guattari, frecuentó a Michel Foucault, ocupó universidades y fue feliz. Hoy asegura que esa posibilidad fue clausurada: los humanos ya no imaginan, no sienten, no hacen silencio, no reflexionan ni se aburren. Los cuerpos no se comunican y, por tanto, conocer el mundo se vuelve un horizonte imposible. Frente a una realidad atravesada por la emergencia de regímenes fascistas –enmascarados con globos, pochoclos y dientes brillantes– los ciudadanos protagonizan una sociedad violenta, caracterizada por la “epidemia de la descortesía”. Fundó revistas, creó radios alternativas y señales de TV comunitarias, publicó libros entre los que se destacan, “La fábrica de infelicidad” (2000), “Después del futuro” (2014) y Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación conectiva (2017). En esta oportunidad plantea cómo sobrevivir en un escenario de fascismo emergente, de vértigo y agresividad a la orden del día.
–A menudo plantea la frase: “El capitalismo está muerto pero seguimos viviendo al interior del cadáver”. ¿Qué quiere decir con ello?
–La vitalidad y la energía innovadora que el capitalismo tenía hasta la mitad del siglo XX se acabó. Hoy se ha transformado en un sistema esencialmente abstracto, los procesos de financierización de la economía son los que dominan la escena y la producción útil ha sido reemplazada. En la medida en que no se podía pensar el valor de cambio sin primero recaer en el valor de uso, siempre creímos que el capitalismo era muy malo pero promovía el progreso. Hoy, por el contrario, no produce nada útil sino que solo se acumula y acumula valor.
–¿Por qué no nos relacionamos?
–La abstracción de la comunicación ha producido un proyecto de intercambio de signos financieros digitales que, por supuesto, no requiere de la presencia de personas para poder efectuarse. Los cuerpos se aíslan: cuánto más conectados menos comunicados estamos. Me refiero a una crítica al progreso que ya se ha discutido tenazmente con Theodor Adorno y Max Horkheimer en Dialéctica de la Ilustración. En la introducción del libro señalan que el pensamiento crítico y la democracia firman su condena a muerte si no logran comprender las consecuencias tenebrosas de la ilustración. Si no entendemos que la mayoría de la población reacciona de una manera miedosa al cambio todo terminará muy mal.
–¿En qué sentido?
–Creíamos que Adolf Hitler había perdido y no es verdad. Perdió una batalla, pero todavía gana sus guerras. Los líderes Rodrigo Duterte (Filipinas), Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini (Italia) y Víktor Orbán (Hungría) representan los signos de un nazismo emergente y triunfante en todo el mundo.
–¿Por qué se vive con tanta violencia y agresividad?
–Puedo responderte con la reproducción de una frase que leí en el blog de un joven de 19 años: “Desde mi nacimiento he interactuado con entidades automáticas y nunca con cuerpos humanos. Ahora que estoy en mi juventud, la sociedad me dice que tengo que tener sexo con personas, las cuales son menos interesantes y mucho más brutales que las entidades virtuales”. Esto quiere decir que al relacionarnos –cada vez más– con autómatas perdemos la expertise, la capacidad de lidiar con la ambigüedad de los seres humanos y nos volvemos brutales. En efecto, miramos con mejores ojos a las máquinas. La violencia sexual es la falta de aptitud del sexo para poder hablar. De hecho, vivimos hablando de sexo, pero el sexo no habla. No logramos comprender el placer del deseo del cortejo, de la ironía, de la seducción y, en este sentido, lo único que queda cuando rascamos el fondo del tarro es la violencia, la apropiación brutal del otro.
–Si la capacidad emotiva se ha perdido y la de razonar se está desvaneciendo, ¿qué nos queda como Humanidad?
–No hay salida del nazismo global. Lo único que queda como respuesta es el trauma, a partir de la readaptación del cerebro colectivo. El problema fundamental no es político, sino cognoscitivo: la victoria de Bolsonaro no representa solo una desgracia para el pueblo brasileño, pues, también es una declaración de muerte para los pulmones de la Humanidad. Te lo digo como asmático: la destrucción de la Amazonia que se está preparando implica una verdadera catástrofe. Mientras que el final de nuestros recursos se aproxima, la evolución del conocimiento social, algunas veces, demanda dos o más siglos.
–Si ya no podemos imaginar, será imposible construir futuros.
–Por supuesto, si no imaginamos no podemos actuar. La imaginación depende de lo que conocemos, de nuestras trayectorias y experiencias y, sobre todo, de nuestra percepción empática del ambiente y del cuerpo ajeno. Ya no vivimos emocionalmente de manera solidaria. Los jóvenes hoy están solos, muy solos. Necesitamos construir un movimiento erótico para curar al cerebro colectivo. Se trata de volver a unificar al cuerpo y al cerebro, a la emoción y al entendimiento. Desde aquí, #NiUnaMenos es la única experiencia mundial que, desde mi perspectiva, recupera estos vínculos. Debemos aprender de este fenómeno y extenderlo a otras áreas, recuperar derechos, volver a vivir la vida.
jueves, 14 de junio de 2018
¿Por qué China será la mayor potencia del siglo XXI? Una respuesta filosófica.
¿POR QUÉ CHINA SERÁ LA MAYOR POTENCIA MUNDIAL DEL SIGLO XXI? UNA RESPUESTA FILOSÓFICA.
por Fernando Gutiérrez Almeira
Hay una diferencia fundamental entre la manera de ser del pueblo chino y la manera occidental. En Occidente la gigantesca influencia que los filósofos racionalistas tuvieron en la construcción del pensamiento político llevó a una mentalidad que pone énfasis en la relevancia autónoma de la teoría sobre sus consecuencias prácticas, una tendencia que tiene sus raíces en las idealizaciones cristianas que apuntaron durante mucho tiempo a un desapego de las cuestiones llamadas espirituales de las cuestiones llamadas materiales. Mientras tanto, en China, el país más ateo de la Tierra, el confucianismo generó una mentalidad centrada en la práctica y las consecuencias de la práctica concreta sobre el individuo y la sociedad, con un discurso caracterizado por el establecimiento de principios de acción y no de largas y sofisticadas argumentaciones teoréticas.
Otra diferencia fundamental, a la que también contribuyeron las disputas entre racionalistas y empiristas en Occidente, es la acentuación occidental sobre las potencias mentales del individuo, algo que permitió a Occidente ser el motor del desarrollo de la ciencia y la tecnología en primer lugar, pero que desde el punto de vista político engendró una fuerte tendencia a la fragmentación y privatización del poder social, convirtiéndose la riqueza y el poder no en objetivos socialmente enfocados sino en objetos de disputa y conflicto permanente, con una grave disociación entre el interés individual y el interés social. Mientras tanto el pueblo chino, que permaneció atrasado por mucho tiempo frente al desarrollismo individualista occidental, parecía estancarse en su concepción confuciana de subordinar lo individual a lo social. A principios del siglo XX en China se hizo todo lo posible para salir de aquel estancamiento humillante tratando de adoptar rápidamente el punto de vista occidental o de incorporarlo de alguna manera. Pero, por supuesto, aquella mirada occidental sobre la existencia no podía tener raigambre en el pueblo chino.
Fue con Mao Zedong y su adopción del marxismo que China logró encontrar una vía práctica para responder a la hegemonía occidental y rehacerse desde su total desventaja. En ese entonces, y estamos hablando de la mitad del siglo XX y bajo el ataque absolutamente destructivo de Japón, China era prácticamente un pueblo de campesinos que vivían bajo una vieja tradición que podía ser considerada moribunda. Sin embargo, Mao combinó el pensamiento marxista, que hace énfasis sobre lo social incluso contra lo individual, y que es, si se quiere, una reacción interna de Occidente contra su propio individualismo, con una exaltación del poder social del campesinado. Al hacerlo Mao probablemente no fue consciente de que la adaptabilidad del marxismo a la mentalidad china era solo posible por las bases confucianas de la misma, y por esa falta de comprensión es que pretendió censurar el pensamiento del viejo filósofo. El resultado fue una fuerza incontenible, que puesta en acción, hundió las esperanzas del imperio japonés de someter a China, expulsó de China a los que intentaban imponer el modelo occidental liberal y dio la capacidad a China de dar el primer paso para evitar su hundimiento histórico bajo la hegemonía occidental. La tasa de alfabetización subió del 15 % en 1949 al 80 % a mediados de los años 1970 y entre 1949 y 1976, China, el «enfermo de Asia», se transformó en una potencia industrial importante: el crecimiento económico en PIB per cápita durante el período de Mao (1952-78) fue del 6,6% anual.
Tras millones de muertos, vastas y dolorosas guerras, y un período de ascenso industrial, China volvía a exigir su lugar en el mundo hacia fines de los años 70, y no porque el marxismo por si mismo fuera la respuesta a sus problemas sino porque el marxismo se adaptaba mejor que las otras formas ideológicas occidentales a la forma de ser china, fraguada en la cuna de Confucio, que sujeta lo individual a lo social, y la voluntad a la disciplina, la autodisciplina y la autoridad. Mientras tanto el socialismo muy pronto cayó en discontinuidades y fracasos en el mundo occidental, que tuvieron su punto más álgido en la desintegración de la Unión Soviética. Y esto simplemente porque el énfasis en la libertad individual de los filósofos de la modernidad occidental es un fundamento casi inconmovible de la mentalidad occidental moderna con el que el socialismo no pudo lidiar excepto justo allí donde ese énfasis no había tenido suficiente influencia, es decir, en un pueblo como el chino.
Pero pronto los líderes chinos se dieron cuenta que la herramienta marxista tenía límites claros en cuanto a su capacidad de incentivar el crecimiento económico y la potencialidad interna y externa china. Así que, nuevamente guiados por su sentido práctico, que convierte a las teorías en herramientas y no exalta su racionalidad, iniciaron prontamente, con Deng Xiaoping, una apertura que combinó el emprendimiento empresarial de estilo occidental, basado en el interés privado e individual y el lucro codicioso, con la sujeción firme del poder social en manos del Partido Comunista. Nunca fue una verdadera occidentalización de China lo que se propusieron Deng y sus seguidores, sino una combinación práctica de los beneficios de la iniciativa individual y una autoridad política absolutamente firme para poder controlarla. Ello puede notarse en la recordada represión de la plaza de Tiananmen, donde Deng tuvo que optar, y lo hizo poniendo límites al reformismo que él mismo había incentivado, a sangre y fuego. El período de Deng, que duró décadas, fue de difícil equilibrio, pues había que conservar la vía confuciana de la disciplina social basada en la autoridad que el marxismo reafirmaba y dejar al mismo tiempo que se introdujera el elemento de la iniciativa individual capitalista. El resultado fue absolutamente exitoso desde el punto de vista económico, pero muy lastimoso desde el punto de vista de las pérdidas causadas al tejido de la sociedad y el medio ambiente, e incluso el aumento brutal de la corrupción, que solo se mantuvo a raya con métodos también brutales.
Pero la visión china es una visión a largo plazo, y no ha dejado de ser una visión centrada en el poder social, en la autoridad, en la valoración confuciana de la importancia del trabajo, la disciplina, la contención de los impulsos, la familia, las virtudes sociales, y la moderación de los gobernantes. La concesión del período de Deng pudo parecer, vista desde Occidente, una entrada de China en el modelo occidental y el capitalismo más extremo. De ningún modo. Hoy estamos ante el ascenso de un tercer líder práctico, con una gigantesca autoridad similar a la de Mao o la de Deng, Xi Jinping. Y su pensamiento retoma el énfasis en el marxismo y en los valores confucianos, realizando un final combate a la corrupción, reajustando la iniciativa individual para sujetarla firmemente al poder social, y centrándose en la redistribución de la riqueza alcanzada a toda la sociedad china, proceso que apenas comienza pero que ya rinde sus frutos. De nuevo, no se trata de una doctrina cerrada, de una teoría rígidamente centrada y racionalizada, sino de un grupo reducido de principios prácticos que son ofrecidos por el nuevo líder como guía de acción:
-Garantizar el liderazgo del Partido sobre todo el trabajo
-Comprometerse con un enfoque centrado en la sociedad
-Continuar con una reforma integral y profunda
-Adoptar una nueva visión para el desarrollo
-Ver que la sociedad es quien gobierna el país
-Garantizar que cualquier área de gobierno está basada en el derecho
-Defensa de los valores socialistas
-Garantizar y mejorar las condiciones de vida de la sociedad a través del desarrollo
-Garantizar la armonía entre el humano y la naturaleza
-Perseguir un enfoque global para la seguridad nacional
-Defender la absoluta autoridad del Partido sobre el Ejército popular
-Defender el principio de “un país, dos sistemas” y promover la reunificación nacional
-Promover la construcción de una sociedad de futuro compartido con toda la humanidad
-Ejercer un control total y riguroso del Partido
Como puede notarse se insiste en el desarrollismo y la reforma, pensando a China como capaz de sumarse al reto de fomentar el progreso científico y tecnológico de la humanidad, pero al mismo tiempo se hace mucho énfasis en la autoridad del Partido Comunista, con lo cual se hace énfasis en el principio de autoridad, y un punto clave es, puede verse…”Comprometerse con un enfoque centrado en la sociedad” o “Ver que la sociedad es quién gobierna el país”, dos principios que claramente reafirman lo social sobre lo individual, y el poder social sobre el poder privado. Y estos principios ofrecidos por el líder no son vistos por los chinos como las promesas políticas que hacen los líderes occidentales, sino como guías de acción a las que hay que obedecer con la cabeza, el cuerpo y el corazón. De este modo, con su mentalidad práctica, China ha logrado responder al reto occidental, que hizo de Occidente el promotor inicial de la ciencia, la tecnología y la libertad de pensamiento, sin perder su raíz primigenia, la nacida del filósofo Confucio, aquel que decía que: “Desde el hombre más noble al más humilde, todos tienen EL DEBER de mejorar y corregir su propio ser”. Y se podrá pensar que el pueblo chino ya no es consciente de la influencia del inmenso filósofo sobre su cultura, sobre su pasado, su presente y su futuro, pero en realidad, hoy existe en China un gigantesco resurgimiento del confucianismo que está siendo apoyado por el propio Xi Jinping.
lunes, 11 de junio de 2018
sábado, 25 de noviembre de 2017
How Norway Proves Laissez-faire Economics Is Not Just Wrong, It’s Toxic.
A surprisingly simple solution to the conflict between self-interest and mutual benefits at all hierarchical levels
By David S. Wilson, Dag O. Hessen
Life consists of units within units. In the biological world, we have genes, individuals, groups, species, and ecosystems – all nested within the biosphere. In the human world, we have genes, individuals, families, villages and cities, provinces, and nations – all nested within the global village. In both worlds, a problem lurks at every rung of the ladder: a potential conflict between the interests of the lower-level units and the welfare of the higher-level units. What’s good for me can be bad for my family. What’s good for my family can be bad for my village, and so on, all the way up to what’s good for my nation can be bad for the global village.
For most of human existence, until a scant 10 or 15 thousand years ago, the human ladder was truncated. All groups were small groups whose members knew each other as individuals. These groups were loosely organized into tribes of a few thousand people, but cities, provinces, and nations were unknown.
Today, over half the earth’s population resides in cities and the most populous nations teem with billions of people, but groups the size of villages still deserve a special status. They are the social units that we are genetically adapted to live within and they can provide a blueprint for larger social units, including the largest of them all – the global village of nations.
Groups into Organisms
The conflict between lower-level selfishness and higher-level welfare pervades the biological world. Cancer cells selfishly spread at the expense of other cells within the body, without contributing to the common good, ultimately resulting in the death of the whole organism. In many animal societies, the dominant individuals act more like tyrants than wise leaders, taking as much as they can for themselves until deposed by the next tyrant. Single species can ravage entire ecosystems for nobody’s benefit but their own.
But goodness has its own advantages, especially when those who behave for the good of their groups are able to band together and avoid the depredations of the selfish. Punishment is also a powerful weapon against selfishness, although it is often costly to wield. Every once in a great while, the good manage to decisively suppress selfishness within their ranks. Then something extraordinary happens. The group becomes a higher-level organism. Nucleated cells did not evolve by small mutational steps from bacterial cells but as groups of cooperating bacteria. Likewise, multi-cellular organisms are groups of highly cooperative cells, and the insects of social insect colonies, while physically separate, coordinate their activities so well that they qualify as super-organisms. Life itself might have originated as groups of cooperating molecular reactions.
Only recently have scientists begun to realize that human evolution represents a similar transition. In most primate species, members of groups cooperate to a degree but are also each other’s main rivals. Our ancestors evolved to suppress self-serving behaviors that are destructive for the group, at least for the most part, so that the main way to succeed was as a group. Teamwork became the signature adaptation of our species.
Extant hunter-gatherer societies still reflect the kind of teamwork that existed among our ancestors for thousands of generations. Individuals cannot achieve high status by throwing their weight around but only by cultivating a good reputation among their peers. Most of human moral psychology – including its other-oriented elements such as solidarity, love, trust, empathy, and sympathy, and its coercive elements such as social norms enforced by punishment – can be understood as products of genetic evolution operating among groups, favoring those that exhibited the greatest teamwork.
From Genes to Culture
Teamwork in our ancestors included physical activities such as childcare, hunting and gathering, and offense and defense against other groups. Human teamwork also acquired a mental dimension including an ability to transmit learned information across generations that surpasses any other species. This enabled our ancestors to adapt to their environments much more quickly than by the slow process of genetic evolution. They spread over the globe, occupying all climatic zones and hundreds of ecological niches. The diversity of human cultures is the cultural equivalent of the major genetic adaptive radiations in dinosaurs, birds, and mammals. The invention of agriculture initiated a positive feedback process between population size and the ability to produce food leading to the mega-societies of today.
Cultural evolution differs from genetic evolution in important respects but not in the problem that lurks at every rung of the social ladder. Just like genetic traits, cultural traits can spread by benefitting lower-level units at the expense of the higher-level good – or by contributing to the higher-level good. There can be cultural cancers, no less so than genetic cancers. And for teamwork to exist at any given rung of the social ladder, there must be mechanisms that hold the wolves of selfishness at bay. A nation or the global village is no different in this respect than a human village, a hunter-gatherer group, an ant colony, a multi-cellular organism, or a nucleated cell.
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Modern nations differ greatly in how well they function at the national scale. Some manage their affairs efficiently for the benefit of all their citizens. They qualify at least as crude superorganisms. Other nations are as dysfunctional as a cancer-ridden patient or an ecosystem ravaged by a single species. Whatever teamwork exists is at a smaller scale, such as a group of elites exploiting the nation for its own benefit. The nations that work have safeguards that prevent exploitation from within, like scaled-up villages. The nations that don’t work will probably never work unless similar safeguards are implemented.
Accomplishing teamwork at the level of a nation is hard enough, but it isn’t good enough because there is one more rung in the social ladder. Although many nations have a long way to go before they serve their own citizens well, a nation can be as good as gold to its own citizens and still be a selfish member of the global village. In fact, there are many examples in the international arena, where nations protect their own perceived interests at expense of the common global future. We will address some of these issues for Norway, which serves its own citizens well by most metrics and also has ambitions to serve the global village well, but still sometimes succumbs to selfishness at the highest rung of the social ladder.
The Norway Case
Norway functions exceptionally well as a nation. Although it is small in comparison with the largest nations, it is still many orders of magnitude larger than the village-sized groups of our ancestral past. Seen through the lens of evolutionary theory, the dividing line between function and dysfunction has been notched upward so that the whole nation functions like a single organism. This is an exaggeration, of course. Self-serving activities that are bad for the group can be found in Norway, but they are modest in comparison with the more dysfunctional nations of the world.
Norway’s success as a nation is already well known without requiring an evolutionary lens. Along with other Nordic countries, it scores high on any list of economic and life quality indicators. The success of the so-called “Nordic Model” is commonly attributed to factors such as income equality, a high level of trust, high willingness to pay tax, which is tightly coupled to strong social security (health, education), a blend of governmental regulations and capitalism, and cultural homogeneity. These and other factors are important, but we think that viewing them through an evolutionary lens is likely to shed light on why they are important. Our hypothesis is that Norway functions well as a nation because it has successfully managed to scale up the social control mechanisms that operate spontaneously in village-sized groups. Income equality, trust, and the other factors attributed to Norway’s success emanate from the social control mechanisms.
Our evolutionary lens also sheds light on Norway’s behavior as a member of the global village. Not without reason, Norway prides itself as a “nation of goodness.” Norwegian foreign policy no doubt plays a positive role in world affairs, also aiming for a “civilized capitalism,” and Norway is the country that has pressed the UN to accept guidelines that make not only states, but also multinational companies, liable for violation of human rights. Also, Norway is currently the world’s most active advocate of corporate social responsibility on all international arenas. Hence, in this context, Norway has done a great deal to behave as a solid citizen of the global village. On the other hand, for all its success and wisdom, the management of the state pension fund illustrates that even Norway is sometimes guilty of selfishly feathering its own nest at the expense of other nations, the planet, and, therefore, ultimately its own welfare over the long term.
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global is by far the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, currently exceeding 800 billion USD, and rapidly growing. The fund is owned by the state on explicit behalf of current and future generations. It is administrated by the Ministry of Finance, which gives guidelines to the investment branch of the Norwegian State Bank (Norwegian Bank Investment Management, NBIM). A separate Council of Ethics (appointed by the government) serves the role of advising the Ministry on which companies to divest from due to serious ethical misconduct (details in the structure and mandates can be found here).
The fund has two major ethical concerns: It should provide good returns to future generations, and it should not contribute to severe unethical acts. The major emphasis has been on the first goal. A core management issue is the rule of maximum spending (handlingsregelen), i.e., that no more than 4% of the annual income can enter the annual state budget for public spending. This ensures that the fund will be used for the long-term welfare of Norway, not just short-term welfare.
This is admirable management of common goods and can serve as an example of how natural resources can be managed for the benefit of an entire nation. At the opposite extreme, consider Equatorial Guinea, which allocates almost the entire income from its oil to the benefit of a single family (the president and his close relatives). For the rest of the population, the life expectancy is 51 years, and 77% have an income of less than 2 US dollars per day. Most other oil-producing nations direct at least some of their revenues to collective goods, but much of it is diverted to political and corporate elites and/or short-term spending. In this context, the Norwegian Pension Fund is quite unique with is long term investments.
However, if we go further and ask whether the investments are to the benefit of the long-term welfare of the global village, the answer is very close to a “No.” The main goal of the fund is maximum return, and although Norway has set up to 3 billion NOK aside for preservation of rainforests, it has also (at least up to now) invested heavily in logging companies replacing rainforest with palm oil. There are also heavy investments in mining industries, coal and oil companies, and other activities that do not contribute to a sustainable future. There is no overall “green,” sustainable, or ethical profile for evaluating investments. There is only an Ethical Council that advises the Ministry of Finance, which decides (often after considerable delay) whether or not the bank (NBIM) should divest in certain companies that perform major, unethical practices. Such divestments are made public, so at least they are open to the gaze of Norwegians and the rest of the world – no doubt increasing their impact. The problem is, however, that the investments per se are guided almost solely by the principle of maximum returns, not by principles of long term, sustainable (environmental as well as morally) investments that would benefit the global village – as well as Norway. So, if even Norway fails to recognize the long-term benefits of a strategy beyond narrow national self-interest, what kind of mechanisms can be invoked to the benefit of the global village?
Organizing the Global Village
Norway’s double standard at the highest rung of the social ladder is typical of most nations. Around the world, politicians talk unashamedly about pursuing the national interest as if it is their highest moral obligation. Double standards easily trigger a feeling of moral indignation. How could persons or nations be so hypocritical? But wagging fingers at nations is not going to solve the problem. A smarter approach is to understand why moral indignation works at the scale of a village, why it doesn’t work at the scale of the global village, and how it can be made to work with the implementation of the appropriate social controls.
Imagine living in a village and meeting someone who talks unabashedly about her own interests as if no one else matters. As far as she is concerned, the other villagers are merely tools for accomplishing her own ends. How would you react to such a person? Speaking for ourselves, we would be shocked to the point of questioning her sanity. We might entertain similar thoughts, but we wouldn’t be so open about it. Moreover, our selfish impulses are tempered by a genuine concern for others. Empathy, sympathy, solidarity, and love are as much a part of the human repertoire as greed. We would probably experience the same feeling of moral indignation welling up in us that we feel toward Norway’s questionable behavior. Even if we remained dispassionate, we would avoid her, warn others, and feel moved to punish her for her antisocial ways. As would most of the other villagers, so despite her intentions, she would probably not fare very well.
Moral indignation works at the scale of villages because it is backed up by an arsenal of social control mechanisms so spontaneous that we hardly know it is there. The most strongly regulated groups in the world are small groups, thanks to countless generations of genetic and cultural evolution that make us the trusting and cooperative species that we are.
The idea that trust requires social control is paradoxical because social control is not trusting. Nevertheless, social control creates an environment in which trust can flourish. When we know that others cannot harm us, thanks to a strong system of social controls, then we can express our positive emotions and actions toward others to their full extent: helping because we want to, not because we are forced to. When we feel threatened by those around us, due to a lack of social control, we withhold our positive emotions and actions like a snail withdrawing into its shell.
This is why people refrain from unethical acts – to the extent that they do – in village-sized groups and why cooperation is accompanied by positive emotions such as solidarity, empathy, and trust. The reason that nations and other large social entities such as corporations openly engage in unethical acts is because social controls are weaker and are not sufficient to hold the wolves of selfishness at bay. This is why politicians can talk openly about national self-interest as if nothing else matters – even though a villager who talked in a comparable fashion would be regarded as insane.
Understanding the nature of the problem enables us to sympathize with the plight of Norway when it chooses how to invest in the global market. Like a snail, it might want to emerge from its shell and support the most ethical enterprises. But to do so might be too costly in a market environment that rewards naked selfishness. Norway might be required to shrink into its shell and make selfish investments to survive. After all, snails have shells for a reason.
A third option is available to Norway and all other nations, which is to create the same kinds of social controls at a large scale that curtail selfishness in smaller groups. This is also costly, like investing in ethical enterprises that don’t yield the highest profits, but it has a more lasting benefit because once a social control infrastructure is in place, it is the ethical enterprises that yield the highest returns. Norway has come a long way to employ this principle in its official foreign policy, but it is clearly lagging behind on the global business scene when it comes to own investments.
There is evidence that village-like social controls are starting to form at larger scales without the help of governments. In the United States, a nonprofit organization called B-lab (B stands for benefit) provides a certification service for corporations. Those that apply for certification receive a score on the basis of a detailed examination. If the score exceeds a certain value, then the company is permitted to advertise itself as a B-Corporation. Xiujian Chen and Thomas F. Kelly at Binghamton University’s School of Management recently analyzed a sample of 130 B-corporations and compared them to a number of matched samples of other corporations. The samples were matched with respect to geographical location, business sector, corporation size, and other variables. In all cases, the B-corporations were either as profitable or more profitable (on average) than the corporations in the matched samples. Engaging in ethical practices did not hurt, and might even have helped, their bottom lines.
More analysis will be required to pinpoint why B-corporations do well by doing good. One possibility is that they have become like villages in their internal organization so there is less selfishness from within. Another possibility, which is not mutually exclusive, is that consumers are increasingly adopting a norm that causes them to prefer to do business with ethical companies and to shun unethical companies, exactly as they would prefer and avoid people in a village setting. Certification as a B-Corporation makes it easier for consumers to evaluate a company’s ethical reputation. Knowing someone’s reputation comes naturally in a village setting, but work is required to provide the same information at a larger scale. Adherence to other codes performs a similar function, such as the UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2012), the International Corporate Governance Network´s Code (ICGN) or the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance Statement on the Role of Shareholders (SCGC) to mention a few.
There are even indications that the corporate world is becoming more village-like without requiring formal certifications. As an example, Apple chief executive Tim Cook was recently criticized by the National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) for failing to maximize profit for its shareholders by investing for the benefit of the climate and the environment. Cook became strikingly upset and advised those with such narrow self-centered goals to sell their stocks. He was behaving precisely as a good villager would behave – and if his reaction became the norm among large corporate entities, the global village would become more like a real village without the need for formal certifications.
It might seem too good to be true that consumers and the corporate world are spontaneously starting to hold the wolves of selfishness at bay by implementing the same kinds of social control that we take for granted at a village scale. If this did come to pass, then Norway would no longer be faced with difficult choices in how to invest its vast wealth in the global market, because the most ethical companies would also be the most profitable. But if this is happening at all, it is still in its initial stages. At present, it is still the case that some of the most profitable investments are of the cancerous variety.
Therefore, Norway is faced with a difficult moral choice similar to that of most investors. It can remain in its shell and make the most profitable investments to maximize short-term returns for its shareholders (in this case, the Norwegian population) without regard to worldwide ethical concerns, or it can emerge from its shell, live up to its ideal standards in domestic as well as foreign policy, and join with other right-minded individuals, corporations, and nations to help create the social control system that can make ethical practices most profitable. The crucial point is that this is a win-win situation in the long term because, ultimately, we are all in the same boat, and what is good for the world, in a long-term sustainability perspective, will also be good for Norwegians.
A New Narrative
In this essay, we have sketched a surprisingly simple solution to the apparent conflict between self-interest and mutual benefits at all hierarchical levels. We are suggesting that the social dynamics that take place naturally and spontaneously in villages can be scaled up to prevent the ethical transgressions that routinely take place at a large scale. Why is such a simple solution not more widely known and discussed? Although we immediately realize this solution when it comes to cell-organism relationships or individuals within villages, we do not realize that the same principles also hold for companies or nations. One reason is because of an alternative narrative that pretends that the only social responsibility of a company is to maximize its bottom line. Free markets will ensure that society benefits as a result. This narrative makes it seem reasonable to eliminate social controls – precisely the opposite of what needs to be done. Governments have been under the spell of this narrative for nearly 50 years despite a flimsy scientific foundation and ample evidence for its harmful effects. We can break the spell of the old narrative by noting something that will appear utterly obvious in retrospect: The unregulated pursuit of self-interest is cancerous at all scales. To create a global village, we must look to real villages.
Originally titled Blueprint for a Global Village.
24 October 2015
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